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This Article examines trends in public opinion and media coverage on gay 
marriage to evaluate the claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas 
and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of 
Health catalyzed an anti-gay “backlash.”  We find that in the immediate aftermath of 
Lawrence a larger share of the American public expressed hostile attitudes on questions 
tapping opinions on gay sex and gay marriage.  That backlash continued through the two 
Goodridge decisions and the 2004 election, but appears to have leveled off and even 
returned to pre-Lawrence levels by the summer of 2005.  Over that same period the 
public appears to have become more sharply divided along ideological lines regarding 
gay marriage.  Another important difference is that a growing share of the public now 
expresses favorable attitudes toward same-sex civil unions.  We conclude with some 
words of caution on the interpretation of polling data and with general thoughts 
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 Almost immediately after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the 
state’s ban on same-sex marriages violated the state’s constitution,1 liberals and 
conservatives alike predicted political backlash.  That backlash materialized in many 
forms: in a proposed, but ultimately rejected, amendment to the U.S. Constitution that 
would have banned same-sex marriage, in a series of thirteen successful similar 
amendments to state constitutions passed in 2004, perhaps in the increase in the vote for 
certain Republican candidates,2 and, as we explore in this paper, in a short-term increase 
in the share of the population with hostile attitudes towards gays and same-sex marriage.  
The political impact of that decision, as well as its less salient but equally influential 
Supreme Court predecessor, Lawrence v. Texas,3 has opened up old questions about the 
relationship between court decisions and public opinion change, as well as the proper role 
of courts in shaping social policy.  This Article examines the possible role of these court 
decisions and related elite and media attention in the shaping of public opinion on gay 
marriage and on gay rights generally.  The article also attempts to review the structure of 
public opinion on gay marriage and provides words of caution as to how to interpret the 
many public opinion polls conducted in this area. Although we do not generalize beyond 
the findings on this particular issue, we attempt to situate our findings in the larger debate 
over the effect of Supreme Court opinions on public opinion change. 
 
 Part I of this study reviews previous research and theoretical arguments on the 
role courts should play and have played in shaping public opinion on constitutional rights 
and notions of equality.  Part II examines the trends in public opinion over the past 
twenty years on questions relating to gay rights, offering some new insights as to the role 
of media coverage of the AIDS epidemic in shaping public opinion concerning sex 
between gays.  Part III examines American public opinion on same-sex marriage, paying 
particular attention to the trajectory of public opinion change alongside media coverage 
of the various court decisions and other political events.  We present evidence there of a 
backlash in the two years following Lawrence that completely disappears by the summer 
of 2005.   Part IV performs the same analysis for Massachusetts’ respondents alone and 
finds little difference between the shape of the public opinion trend in that state and the 
nation.  Massachusetts residents have always been more supportive of gay marriage than 
the country at large, but their backlash and resurgence on the issue follows the pattern of 
the rest of the country.  Part V examines the structure or breakdown of opinion on gay 
marriage while offering some insights as to the extent of the opinion backlash among 
population subgroups.  The most significant finding concerning the shift in the structure 
of opinion over the two-year period following Lawrence is the rise in the significance of 
ideology in explaining individual opinion on gay marriage.  Like others who have 
analyzed similar data, we find that age, education, religiosity, race, ideology, and 
                                                 
1 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
2 We disagree with those who suggest that the issue of gay marriage was determinative of the 2004 
presidential election, either nationally or in Ohio.  In unpublished research, Simon Jackman has provided 
persuasive evidence that gay marriage referenda did not differentially mobilize Republican voters nor did it 
convince voters otherwise supportive of John Kerry to vote for President Bush. Much work remains to be 
done on this question, but little of the available evidence suggests gay marriage decided the 2004 election. 
3 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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partisanship explain much of the variation in opinion on same-sex marriage; however, we 
also refine earlier analyses to find that a respondent’s rating on moral traditionalism and 
libertarianism scales predicts individual attitudes towards same-sex marriage.  We also 
attempt to isolate the effects of these variables while holding constant individuals’ 
hostility toward gays as reflected in “feeling thermometer” ratings that respondents 
assign to gays.  In Part VI, we turn our attention to questions concerning civil unions and 
a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.  Although we notice a short-
term backlash in opinion on same-sex marriage, as well as other gay rights issues, the 
share of the population expressing a favorable opinion on civil unions appears to have 
grown steadily over the same period.  Opinion on a constitutional amendment is more 
complicated, and gives us an opportunity to discuss the various question-wording effects 
that can change the results by as much as twenty percentage points.  We conclude in Part 
VII with words of caution in generalizing beyond the findings of this particular issue area 
to arrive at a general theory of court decisions’ effects on public opinion. 
 
 A point we will reemphasize several times in this study concerns the notion of 
causation we explore with respect to the relevant court decisions.  At times we will 
suggest that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence or the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge caused a shift in aggregate levels of public 
opinion.  Such a suggestion should not be taken to mean that somehow the courts 
themselves flipped a switch that translated into public opinion change.  Court opinions, 
we maintain, are events like any other that elevate issues onto the national agenda 
through media coverage, elite discussion and other behavior that follows in the wake of 
such opinion.  Such discussion, related action and information flow shape public opinion 
on the issue.   It is usually impossible to isolate the individual effect of court decisions 
when other salient events, such as a debate over a proposed constitutional amendment or 
a mayor’s granting of marriage licenses to gays, occurs closely in time.  Although we feel 
confident in saying that the courts got the ball rolling on the issue of same-sex marriage, 
the shifts in public opinion come not only from the decisions themselves but also from 
the series of events such decisions trigger. 
 
 Moreover, although we pay attention to the effect of court decisions on public 
opinion here, we do not mean to suggest that opinion shifts are the principal means of 
evaluating whether certain court decisions have done more harm than good.  We think we 
add to, but do not come close to settling, the debate among scholars such as Gerald 
Rosenberg4 and Michael Klarman5, concerning the ability of courts to bring about social 
change.  For the most part, these scholars concentrate on elite and mass action, as 
reflected in legislation, election results, and tangible policy change, as opposed to shifts 
in attitudes.  Indeed, we do not dispute that such effects are more important in assessing 
the power of the backlash or leadership a court’s decision produces.  That being said, 
shifts in aggregate opinion and alterations in the structure of opinion represent important 
pieces of additional evidence in their own right of the political impact court decisions, as 
well as potential intervening factors leading to other, more tangible, policy changes.  
 
                                                 
4 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 






I. The Effect of Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Normative Arguments and 
Empirical Evidence 
 
Buckets of ink have been spilled on the pages of law reviews discussing the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” presented by the position of the judicial branch in our 
constitutional system.6  That “difficulty”, if it is one, serves the purposes of several 
different kinds of arguments.  On the one hand, advocates point to courts’ 
countermajoritarian nature as their chief virtue:  No other institution of government is 
designed to protect “discrete and insular minorities” or unpopular individuals exercising 
rights the Constitution protects.  Whether the subject is the integration of schools, 
protecting the right of Communists to speak, or securing the equal right to marry, courts 
are better positioned than the political branches to defend the rights of the unpopular.  On 
the other hand, what makes countermajoritarianism difficult are the necessarily unpopular 
stances the courts take when striking down legislation majorities have supported.  
Therefore, each exercise of judicial review must be justified by some theory as to why 
unelected, life-tenured judges ought to interpret the Constitution in a way as to check 
majority will.  The omnipresent fear that judges might behave like Platonic guardians—
or worse, like Leviathans—often presents itself in arguments about judges imposing their 
own values on the Constitution or arrogantly predicting the trajectory of Americans’ (or 
even other countries’) understanding of constitutional values.   
 
To some extent, the degree of difficulty presented by the courts’ 
countermajoritarian status can be assessed by how out of step court decisions are with 
public opinion on constitutional issues.  After all, if courts merely reflected public 
opinion in their decisions, then whatever other problems they might have, they could not 
be described as countermajoritarian.  Although the distinctive feature of the judicial role 
and position is its supposed insulation from the pressures of public opinion, in several 
recent cases the courts and litigants have put forth public opinion polls as evidence 
supporting a particular constitutional interpretation.7  When used in this way, appeals to 
majoritarian sentiment (whether measurable or not) often justify a mode of constitutional 
argument that views the Constitution as a “living document” and judges’ role as helping 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2003-04); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AMER. 
POL. SCI. REV.  87 (1993). 
7  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (striking down law permitting execution of mentally 
retarded defendants, based in part on polls suggesting the public was against such executions); McConnell 
v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 512-15 (D.D.C.) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.), aff’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 
(2003) (upholding most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act based on polls showing public perception 
of corruption).  See also THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1989) (noting 
that the Supreme Court referred to public opinion in 142 opinions between 1934 and 1985-1986, although 
most references to polls occur in death penalty cases). 
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the Constitution to keep up with the times.  For critics, the Constitution keeps up with the 
times through the Amendment process, and judges are particularly unqualified to assess 
and evaluate majoritarian sentiment. 
 
Given the importance of the countermajoritarian difficulty to constitutional 
theory, it is surprising how little work has been done examining the effect of court 
decisions on American public opinion.  For the most part, those who study the 
relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court focus on public opinion of 
the Court itself and find that individual rulings have little effect, as compared to larger 
trends about government generally.8  In addition, scholars such as Robert Dahl9 and Lee 
Epstein10 have presented rigorous theoretical arguments as to why the appointment 
process and other constraints make it unlikely that the Supreme Court will stray too far 
from American public opinion.  With the exception of Thomas Marshall’s somewhat 
abbreviated study in 1989, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court,11 though, no work has 
attempted to examine in any systematic way how court decisions affect public opinion on 
the issues the Court has considered.  We attempt here to lay out the various hypotheses as 
to the relationship between court decisions and public opinion on constitutional 
controversies, and in the second half of the article we try to unearth which of these 
hypotheses is consistent with the data on public opinion and gay marriage. 
 
 
A. The null hypothesis: the irrelevance of court decisions to public opinion on 
constitutional issues 
 
 The same argument as that concerning attitudes toward the Supreme Court might 
be true concerning how court decisions affect Americans’ opinion on the issues the courts 
consider:  external events, rather than court decisions, may be primarily responsible for 
shifts in public opinion on constitutional values.  The null hypothesis suggests that public 
                                                 
8 See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 659-60 (1992); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, 
Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (Apr. 2003); James 
L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential 
Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted, or Otherwise? 33 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003); W. MURPHY, 
W. TANENHAUS & D. KASTNER, PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATIONS (1973); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Constitutional Courts and Political Representation, in 
MODERN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 541 (M. Danielson & W. Murphy eds. 1969); Murphy & Tanenhaus, 
Explaining Diffuse Support for the United States Supreme Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49 
NOTRE DAME L.REV. 1037 (1974); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and Supreme Court: The 
Goldwater Campaign, 32 PUB. OPINION Q. 31 (1968); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the 
United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 
2 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 357 (1968), reprinted in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (J. Grossman & J. 
Tanenhaus eds.); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court: A Panel Study, 
43 J.POL. 24 (1981). 
9  Robert Dahl, Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279 (1957).  
10 Lee Epstein & Joseph F. Kobylka, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:  
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a  
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001).   
11 THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989). 
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opinion on constitutional issues should not change at all in response to a court decision.12  
Undoubtedly, for most court decisions this must be true.  Most issues courts deal with, 
whether they revolve around torts, antitrust, federal statutes or even important questions 
of constitutional law, are overly complex and/or below the radar of both the mainstream 
media and public attention.  Therefore, the public often does not have either the relevant 
information concerning the court’s decision or the tools to understand it, and we should 
not expect public opinion to change on those issues.13  Moreover, even with highly salient 
and understandable issues (e.g., abortion, gay marriage, the death penalty), there is no a 
priori reason to believe that a court decision will shift people’s opinions, which up until 
the decision have often been based on strong moral or political convictions.14
 
 
B. The Legitimation Hypothesis: Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster15 
 
A second hypothesis, known in the political science literature as the legitimation 
hypothesis, suggests that in some cases public opinion will adjust to align with court 
decisions.16  In other words, some share of the population takes its cues as to how to think 
about issues from the courts, which are relatively respected institutions as compared to 
the political branches.  Once courts, especially the Supreme Court, weigh in on an issue, 
perhaps some share of the population will now say, in effect, “if they believe it, it must be 
right.”  Those who view courts as some sort of conscience for the American people 
expect or hope that judges will lead us to our better selves – to be a “republican 
schoolmaster,” as some have termed the Supreme Court.  Whether the Court is 
persuading the American people of the unfairness of segregation or marshalling its 
political and institutional capital to weigh in on who should win the 2000 election, the 
relative respect the public has for the Court may lead to a presumption in favor of the 
position it takes in cases.   
 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: 
Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAW & SOC. REV. 357, 378 
(1968) (finding that only 12.8 percent of American adults are aware of the Court’s existence, recognize its 
function, and believe it to be impartial and competent); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, 
Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985 (1989-90) (updating their previous work, in the 
context of the Bork nomination fight); Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion in THE AMERICAN 
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson, eds. 1991) (citing a 1989 
Washington Post poll in which fewer than 10 percent of respondents could name the Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, while over one-quarter of respondents could identify television’s Judge Wapner). 
13 We should note that the level of information about the court decisions concerning same-sex marriage 
appears relatively low as well.  For example, a national poll conducted by the University of New 
Hampshire in May 4-9, 2005, found that only 23 percent of Americans correctly answered Massachusetts to 
the question “based on what you know, is there any state in the U.S. in which it is legal for gay and lesbian 
couples to get married?” 
14 Marshall finds that “Supreme Court decisions seldom influence public attitudes on specific issues.”  
MARSHALL, supra note __, at 156.  However, Marshall also finds that “the Supreme Court decisions 
strongly influence short term public opinion changes [in favor of the court’s opinion] only when the Court 
hands down liberal, activist rulings.” Id., at 154.  
15 See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S. CT. REV. 127. See also 
Christopher Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992); 
Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952). 
16 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (1960). 
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Only under special conditions and among certain populations should we expect 
the Court to act as an opinion leader.  In one respect, we should expect the Court to have 
the most influence on issues that are complex and technical and among populations with 
weak prior beliefs.  When an issue is confusing or novel, the Court’s decision is likely to 
be the only (or perhaps the most credible) signal that the average person receives.   That 
being said, the person must actually receive the signal:  for the decision to have any effect 
on public attitudes, the issue must be one where the media conveys the Court’s signal to 
the population.  Of course, these factors cut in opposing directions.  On the one hand we 
should expect the Court to have the greatest influence on low salience issues concerning 
which most people have not yet developed opinions, while at the same time, for the Court 
to have any influence the news of its decision must be salient enough for it to be 
transferred to the public.  We also might add into this mix the importance of the clarity of 
the Court’s signal: unanimous decisions might have a greater pro-decision effect than 
would divided rulings because the information flow directed toward the otherwise 
uninformed public would be more likely to be one-sided.17  Of course, the power and 
clarity of the Supreme Court’s signal on an issue could be obscured by the expressed 
opinions of elites other than dissenting Justices.  Uniform approval of the Court’s 
decision (as with any public policy) should have a greater pro-decision public opinion 
effect than would a decision that creates a firestorm of disapproval: that is, the elite filter 
for the Court’s decisions can be more important as to the impact of the Court’s signal 
than either the reasoning of the opinion itself or the unanimity of agreement on the Court.   
 
Given the many ingredients needed for the Court to behave as an opinion leader 
perhaps we should not be surprised that very few studies have found Court decisions that 
shift public opinion in the Court’s direction.   Experiments that prime a subset of 
respondents as to the Supreme Court’s ruling on an issue come to conflicting results as to 
the persuasive effect of the signal sent by the Court’s imprimatur.18  Valerie Hoekstra 
also finds some support for the notion that in the community directly affected a court 
decision has affects public opinion in a positive direction.19  Marshall finds some 
evidence that the Court’s decisions striking down bans on interracial marriage or 
restrictive covenants were followed by favorable public opinion trends, but given the 
preexisting liberal trends on these issues it is unclear if the Court accelerated those 
trends.20  The same could be said for the Court’s decisions reinstating the death penalty, 
originally upholding bans on sodomy, and striking down bans on contraception, all of 
which failed to interrupt preexisting trends in the direction of the Court’s decision.  
Moreover, many other decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade and 
Miranda v. Arizona, become accepted, at least in name if not in principle, by a large share 
                                                 
17 See MARSHALL, supra note __, at 148 (evaluating the effect of unanimity of opinion change); JOHN 
ZALLER  THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992) (discussing the importance of a one-sided 
versus a two-sided information flow on publics with firm or weak prior beliefs). 
18 Compare Jeffrey J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of 
Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675 (1994) (finding a legitimation effect), with Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, 
The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AMER. POL. Q. 85 
(1980) (finding no effect); Larry R. Bass & Dan Thomas, The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation: 
Experimental Tests, 12 AMER. POL. Q. 335 (1984) (also finding no effect). 
19 VALERIE HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2003); Valerie Hoekstra, The 
Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (2000). 
20 See MARSHALL, supra note __, at 155. 
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of the population over the long term, such that public opinion surveys indicate a large 




A third theory about the relationship between court decisions and public opinion 
(“backlash”) has engendered little systematic exploration, even if popular and scholarly  
accounts often suggest that the public will backlash against the positions taken by the 
Court.22  The psychological and political dynamic that produces backlash would appear a 
bit more complicated.  In the event the public has a low opinion of the Court to begin 
with and therefore has a presumption against its decisions, we would expect the opposite 
dynamic to that predicted by the legitimation hypothesis.  Precisely because an unpopular 
institution (the Court) advocates a particular position, the public will then react as if to 
say “if they believe it, then it must be wrong.”  However, backlash could have other roots 
as well.  A court decision on an issue could raise its salience in some respondents’ minds, 
and they perceive a threat they did not perceive before.23  Or perhaps, in the wake of a 
court decision, elites and interest groups mobilize against its holding, discussion of the 
issue becomes more critical than when the issue was absent from the media radar screen, 
and a section of the public then develops an opinion contrary to the Court’s resolution of 
the case.  Moreover, insofar as the decision itself has tangible policy effects (e.g., busing 
or the settling of a Presidential election) or the political branches respond with laws that 
have tangible policy effects, respondents may accordingly change their positions on the 
issue due to these newly observed and felt implications of the Court’s decision. 
 
Contrary to legitimation, backlash should be more likely when the decision is 
salient enough to send a signal to an otherwise inattentive public and simple enough for 
the public to understand it and react unfavorably.24  Similar to legitimation, though, we 
should expect those with weak prior beliefs to be most likely to change their mind. In 
                                                 
21 According to recent Gallup polls, two thirds of the population is against overruling Roe v. Wade.  See 
The Gallup Poll, Abortion,   available at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1576&pg=1 (66 
percent of respondents answer no to the following question posed in January 20-22, 2006: “Would you like 
to see the Supreme Court overturn its 1973 Roe versus Wade decision concerning abortion, or not?”).  
However, a poll taken in November 11-13, 2005 asked the following question: “Do you think abortions 
should be legal under any circumstances, legal only under certain circumstances, or illegal in all 
circumstances?  (If certain circumstances) Do you think abortion should be legal in most circumstances or 
only in a few circumstances?”  16 percent said illegal in all circumstances and 39 percent said legal in only 
a few circumstances.  The public seems more supportive of the issuance of Miranda warnings, if not 
uniformly in favor of the exclusionary rule. See Lydia Saad, Americans React to Supreme Court Decisions, 
Public agrees with 2 out of 5 major decisions, June 28, 2000, available at 
http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=2770&pg=1 .  94 percent answer yes to the question:  
“When the police arrest someone, do you think the police should or should not be required to inform that 
person of their constitutional rights?”  However, the public is evenly split in answering the following 
question:  “Do you think confessions obtained from defendants who were not read their constitutional 
rights when they were arrested should or should not be admissible in trial?”  45 percent answer yes and 49 
percent answer no. 
22 See Michael Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH L. REV. 431 (2005).  
23 See id. (discussing Southern resistance to Brown). 
24 To be sure, perhaps in an exceptional case elite manipulation and one-sided media discussion might 
provoke backlash even on complicated, non-salient topic.    
 8 
other words, the swayable public should be the most susceptible to the Court’s 
legitimating or backlash-inducing decisions, as should be true for any government action.  
 
Although few have performed sophisticated analyses of the public opinion effects 
of Court decisions, several famous cases usually make the “backlash” list.  At least in 
popular lore, many think public opinion in favor of school desegregation, especially in 
the South, declined in the immediate aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, although 
pro-integrationist opinions were shared by a small share of the Southern population even 
before the decision.25  The best example of backlash, given the substantial rise from 1972 
to 1976 in the share of the population favoring the death penalty, may come from the 
Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia.26  According to Gallup polls, 54 percent of 
the population favored the death penalty for murderers in 1972 whereas 66 percent 
favored it in 1976.  However, in 1971 – a year before the Court delivered its decision in 
Furman – only 49 percent favored the death penalty, suggesting that the pro-death 
penalty trend may have existed before the Court’s intervention, even if the decision 
accelerated it.  Moreover, after a small dip just following the Court’s undermining of 
Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,27 the share of the population in favor of the death penalty 
continued to rise over the succeeding decade.28  The same could be said regarding 
opinion against legalization of same-sex sexual relations following Bowers v. Hardwick.  
Public opinion against legalization rose both before and immediately after Bowers, as we 
discuss in the next Part. 
 
As with legitimation, it is striking how few actual cases of measurable short-term 
backlash exist.  To be sure, there are plenty of instances where the share of the public 
expressing a a certain opinion about a constitutional issue rises or declines following a 
court decision, but a change in direction from a preexisting trend happens quite rarely.  
For this reason, we find the short-term backlash following Lawrence v. Texas, discussed 




Not only might public opinion move in the same or opposite direction as the 
Court’s decision, but a decision could also alter the structure of public opinion on an 
issue.  Many people might change their mind on an issue following court intervention 
                                                 
25 See George Gallup, Vote Favoring Desegregation Up Slightly Since a Year Ago: However Sentiment in 
South is Still Strongly Opposed; 3 Out of 4 Disapprove of Verdict, PUBLIC OPINION NEWS SERVICE, May 
15, 1955.  The Gallup question was: “The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation in the public 
schools is illegal.  This means that all children, no matter what their race, must be allowed to go to the same 
schools.  Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?”  In the nation as a whole, disapproval in the year 
after Brown dropped slightly from 41 percent to 38 percent, while disapproval in the South rose from 71 
percent to 73 percent.  The size of the shifts is probably within the margin of error so we would not make 
much of the results.  
26 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
27 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
28 See The Gallup Poll, Death Penalty, available at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1606.  
Timothy Johnson and Andrew Martin argue that Furman polarized opinion in addition to producing a 
backlash.   See Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme 
Court Decisions, 92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 299, 305 (1998). 
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even though the aggregate shift in opinion might appear slight or nonexistent.  In 
addition, a decision could solidify people’s prior beliefs, causing them to feel more 
strongly about the issue. 
 
For polarization to occur we suspect elite signals must be quite clear and the issue 
should be salient enough such that those signals will be sent and received.  Unlike 
legitimation or backlash, though, we should expect a two-sided information flow to be 
more likely to cause polarization than would a situation in which elite signals all push in 
the same direction.   We should expect the undecided and the uninformed to pick sides 
according to elite discussion of the decision, with people taking cues from their reference 
groups and from opinion leaders they trusted before the decision.  What might have been 
a bell shaped or even random distribution of opinion prior to a court decision, under 
certain conditions could turn into more of a bimodal distribution as people sort 
themselves according to elite framing of the issue.  Such “sorting out” could occur on the 
basis of ideology, partisanship, religion, race or any other group defining characteristic.29
 
The paradigmatic case of polarization is public opinion concerning abortion. 
Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki30 find that while there was little aggregate change in 
public opinion regarding abortion after the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. 
Wade, the salience of the decision led to an increasing polarization among demographic 
groups regarding the legalization of discretionary (i.e., non health-related) abortions.  In 
particular, the gap in opinion on discretionary abortion grew in 1973 between whites and 
blacks and between Protestants and Catholics.  Franklin and Kosaki hypothesize that this 
polarization is most likely to take place in the wake of highly salient Supreme Court 
decisions.  Such decisions become news events that dramatically raise the public’s level 
of information and interest about the issue.  As a result of the conversations and debates 
that take place in the wake of these news events, individuals’ opinions become more like 
those of others in their immediate environment.  The result is that “the effect of group 
interaction is to increase agreement with the modal response within the immediate social 
environment.”31  Thus, following Roe, the opinion of Protestants became more like those 
of other Protestants (who were relatively pro-choice to begin with)—and the same 
happened in the more pro-life Catholic community.  
 
E. A Note on Short Versus Long Term Effects and the Revisiting of 
Constitutional Controversies 
 
No single theory provides a universally applicable explanation for how and when 
courts affect public opinion.  Moreover, the effect of a court decision – as mediated 
through other elite action and mass mobilization – may be felt more over the long term 
than in the few years following the decision.  Controversial holdings – such as the one-
person, one-vote rule, the requirement of Miranda warnings, or perhaps the striking down 
of bans on same-sex sex – may become accepted over the long-run, while others, such as 
                                                 
29 See ZALLER, supra (concerning the importance of information flow on the shift in opinion in population 
subgroups).  
30 Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public 
Opinion and Abortion,  83 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989). 
31 Id. at 763. 
 10 
upholding a right to an abortion, may become more controversial over time and generate 
a increased opposition a decade after the decision.  As difficult as it is to assess causality 
for short term effects, it is even more so with respect to changes in public opinion over 
the long term.  Nevertheless, we do not mean to pretend that the public opinion effects of 
a court decision – as with any legislative or executive action – should only be felt in its 
immediate aftermath. 
  
Moreover, as other scholars have noted,32 we should not expect the Court’s 
reaffirmation, revisiting or overturning of a holding to produce the same effect as its 
initial decision.  Timothy Johnson and Andrew Martin find that later rulings on abortion 
rights and the death penalty did not alter the structure of opinion, as did the initial court 
cases in this area.  Indeed, lurking in their research as well as Marshall’s is probably a 
theory concerning how court decisions that upset the status quo may have more dramatic 
public opinion effects than those that keep things the way they are.  Indeed, as we 
describe with respect to the two Court decisions concerning gays’ right to have sex, the 
reverse of what Johnson and Martin find appears to be true: Bowers v. Hardwick, which 
upheld a law banning sodomy, appeared not to affect the preexisting public opinion trend 




II. Public Opinion on Gay Rights 
 
The debate over same-sex marriage that intensified in 2003 and 2004 arrived in 
the wake of a remarkable, decades-long shift in American attitudes toward gay rights.  
Over the past thirty years, American public opinion regarding gay people, gay rights and 
homosexual sex has moved unambiguously toward acceptance and tolerance.33  However, 
Americans remain deeply uncomfortable with gays as compared to other demographic 
groups, and their support for gay rights does not extend as strongly to the domains of 
sexuality and relationships. 
 
Any discussion of public opinion regarding gays and lesbians must begin with the 
fact that Americans view homosexual behavior through a strong moral lens: in 2004, 57 
percent of the public told the General Social Survey that same-sex relations are “always 
wrong.”  However, this figure has declined in a relatively steady fashion since the late 
1980s, when it peaked at 78 percent.34  Notably, the decline in morally traditionalistic 
views regarding homosexuality has not been accompanied by increasing permissiveness 
on other matters of private behavior related to sexuality.  As shown in Figure 1, opinion 
regarding discretionary abortion, premarital sex, and pornography has remained relatively 
                                                 
32 See Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court 
Decisions, 92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 299 (1998). 
33 See Paul R. Brewer,  The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion about Gay Rights,  65 J. POL. 1208 
(2003); Patrick J. Egan & Kenneth Sherrill,  Neither An In-Law Nor An Outlaw Be: Trends in Americans’ 
Attitudes Toward Gay People, PUBLIC OPINION PROS, February, 2005; Alan S. Yang, The Polls—Trends: 
Attitudes Towards Homosexuality,  61 PUB. OP. Q. 477 (1997); Paul R. Brewer and Clyde Wilcox, Trends: 
Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions 69 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 599 (2005). 
34 See Bowman, supra note † . 
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steady over the past thirty years—and Americans’ condemnation of adultery has risen 
during this time period. 35
                                                 
35 The wording of the questions depicted in Figure A follows.  The graph includes interpolated data for 
years in which the survey was not administered or individual questions were not asked.   
homosexuality:  What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex--do you think it is always 
wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?   
pornography:  Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws?   Illegal 
for all, illegal for those under 18, or legal for all?   
interracial marriage:   Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks/ 
African-Americans) and whites?  
discretionary abortion:  Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman 
to obtain a legal abortion if. . . the woman wants it for any reason?  
premarital sex:  There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing 
in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, 
almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?   
adultery: What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the 
marriage partner--is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?   
women’s role: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their 
homes and leave running the country up to men.   
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Figure 1.  Moral Traditionalism 
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t adultery always wrong
homosexuality always wrong
discretionary abortion always wrong
pornography should be illegal for all
premarital sex always wrong
women's role is in the home




Instead, the trend line of Americans’ views on homosexuality appears to parallel 
(if trail behind) their opinions on issues like interracial marriage and the proper role for 
women in society—issues that are generally framed in terms of equal rights rather than in 
terms of freedom of choice.  For this reason it is no coincidence that over the same time 
period, a growing share of Americans has come to believe that homosexuality as an 
identity, rather than a choice.  In 1983, 16 percent of the public told the Los Angeles 
Times Poll that homosexuality is “something that people are born with,”—a figure that 
rose to 32 percent in 2004. (However, a stable proportion of the public—37 percent in 
1983 and 35 percent in 2004—said homosexuality is “just the way some people prefer to 
live.”)36  Individual-level analysis has found a strong relationship between beliefs about 
the etiology of homosexuality and feelings regarding gay people and gay rights.37
 
Over the past three decades, overwhelming majorities of Americans have come to 
believe that gay people deserve equal employment rights, including employment in the 
military, medicine, politics, and (to a lesser extent) as teachers or clergy.  Yet on aspects 
of gay rights that touch upon gay relationships and sexuality, Americans are less 
supportive—and their opinions have changed much more slowly.  As shown in Figure 2, 
a solid majority of Americans has supported equal opportunities for gays in terms of jobs 
since the late 1980s, but support for legalizing homosexual sex has risen less dramatically 
since the Gallup Poll first fielded a question regarding this topic in 1977.  Opinion 
regarding the legalization of sex between gays has also been more variable over time than 
opinion on employment rights.  Finally (and as is discussed in greater detail in the 
                                                 
36 See Egan & Sherrill, supra note __. 
37 See note __ infra and accompanying text. 
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remainder of this Article), support for the legalization of gay marriage has risen only 
slightly since 1996, the first year Gallup asked Americans their opinion on this issue. 
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be recognized by law





The rise in Americans’ tolerance of homosexuality and their embrace of some 
aspects of the gay rights agenda has been accompanied by a growing familiarity and 
comfort with gay and lesbian people.  Personal contact with gay people has risen 
dramatically: in 1985, 54 percent of Los Angeles Times Poll respondents said they had no 
friends, family members, or co-workers who were gay.  By 2004, this figure dropped to 
27 percent.  As Americans have gotten to know more gay people, they have also become 
more comfortable with them.  The proportion of Times Poll recipients reporting that they 
were sometimes or always uncomfortable around gay people fell from 38 percent in 1983 
to 20 percent in 2004.38   
 
By a widely-used measure of sentiment toward demographic groups—the so-
called “feeling thermometer”—Americans have grown decidedly more warm toward 
gays and lesbians over the past twenty years.  Surveys with feeling thermometers ask 
participants to rate groups on a scale of zero (cold) to 100 (warm), with a score of 50 
considered neutral.  As shown in Figure 3, the average thermometer score assigned to 
gays and lesbians by participants in the American National Election Studies (ANES) has 
increased sharply, from 30 “degrees” in 1984 to 49 in 2004.  It is notable, however, that 
while Americans have begun to express more warmth toward gay people, these feelings 
                                                 
38 See http://www.latimesinteractive.com/pdfarchive/nationworld/la-poll041104-pdf.pdf  
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lag far behind those regarding other demographic groups.  In fact, ANES respondents 
have consistently ranked gays and lesbians either last or next-to-last among all 
demographic groups in every administration of the survey since gays were first included 
in the battery of feeling thermometer questions in 1984. 
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 Research has identified many sources of attitudes regarding gays and lesbians, 
but four variables are consistent, strong predictors of these attitudes: education, 
religiosity, political ideology, and year of birth (cohort).39  All things being equal, 
religiosity and conservative ideology is associated with opposition to homosexuality and 
gay rights, while youth and education are associated with support.  Table A displays how 
respondents to the American National Election Studies survey with varying levels of 
these four demographic variables scored on an index constructed from five survey items 
regarding gay issues.40  The index ranges from zero (least supportive) to 100 (most 
supportive).  A glance at Table 1 indicates how strong the association is between each of 
these four characteristics and support for gay rights: the difference in the index scores 
between respondents at the lowest and highest values of each variable exceeds 20 points.   
                                                 
39 Note that “birth cohort” is a different concept than “age.”  Egan and Sherrill, supra note __, present 
evidence indicating that the gay-supportive attitudes of younger survey respondents are due to cohort 
effects, not life-cycle effects—i.e., that individuals do not become less supportive of gay rights as they 
grow older. 
40 The index was constructed from a simple average of ANES items measuring respondents’ attitudes 
toward gay marriage, adoption of children by homosexual couples, allowing gays to serve in the military, 
and employment rights, as well as the feeling thermometer score assigned to gays and lesbians.  The scale 
reliability coefficient of this index (Cronbach’s alpha) is .75 . 
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Table 1.  Gay-rights index scores  
by demographic categories, 2004 
 






 less than HS diploma 46 
 HS diploma 50 
 college degree 64 
 post-graduate study 72 
   
Birth cohort (year born)  
 before 1927 35 
 between 1927 and 1942 48 
 between 1943 and 1958 57 
 between 1959 and 1974 59 
 after 1974 66 
   
Ideology  
 conservative 48 
 moderate 56 
 liberal 71 
   
Religiosity (attendance of religious services)  
 every week 42 
 almost every week 49 
 once/twice per month 54 
 few times per year 68 
 Never 66 
 
Source for data: 2004 American National Election Studies. 
 
 
III. The Possible Role of Supreme Court Precedent in Shaping Public 
Opinion on Gay Rights 
 
While recognizing that two cases do not a generalization make, the pair of U.S. 
Supreme Court cases adjudicating the constitutionality of state bans on sodomy provides 
a unique opportunity to consider how court decisions affect public opinion.  The two 
cases – Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas – reach opposite results, with the 
former finding no constitutional problem with the arrest of a Georgia man pursuant to 
that state’s ban on sodomy, and the latter striking down on its face Texas’s ban on sex 
between same-sex couples.  The shifts in public opinion in the wake of both decisions can 
fairly be characterized as anti-gay.  In the immediate aftermath of both Lawrence and 
Bowers, the share of respondents who disagreed that “homosexual relations between 
consenting adults should be legal” increased dramatically.  As shown in Figure 4 below, 
before Bowers only 46 percent of the population thought gay sex should be illegal.  
Afterward, that figure rose to 57 percent.  The magnitude of the jump in anti-gay 
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sentiment was similar after Lawrence, even though the population had become much 
more in favor of legalization in the years between the decisions. Before Lawrence, only 
36 percent thought homosexual relations should be illegal; afterwards, that figure rose to 
43 percent.41  In addition to examining aggregate change, we have also looked for 
changes in the determinants of opinion on homosexual sex following each decision.  In 
regression analyses not presented here, we found no such change following Bowers, but 
some change in structure following Lawrence.42
 
Figure 4.  Opinion on the Legality of Gay Sex


















 should not be legal
should be legal
source for data: The Gallup Poll.  Only those expressing an opinion are shown.  




We may have an alternative explanation for the rise in anti-gay sentiment both 
before and after Bowers.  As Figure 5 suggests below, the increasingly negative or (at 
best) static trend in attitudes concerning gay sex remained unaffected by the Bowers 
decision in 1986.43  The trend appears to map well onto coverage that linked gays with 
                                                 
41 In both cases, the change in opinion is statistically significant at p < .001.  Question wording for surveys:  
“Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?” Bowers v. 
Hardwick was announced June 30, 1986; surveys were administered  November 11-18, 1985 and July 11-
14, 1986.  Lawrence v. Texas was announced June 26, 2003; surveys were administered May 19-21, 2003 
and July 25-27, 2003. 
42 In particular, post-Lawrence African Americans became less in favor of legalizing same-sex relations, 
holding constant typical demographic, socio-economic status, and political variables.  The same was true 
for all respondents who either identified with a political party.  At the same time, education became an even 
stronger predictor of support for legalizing same-sex relations after Lawrence than it was before the 
decision was handed down.  None of these trends were found following Bowers. 
43 The top line on the graph refers to the trend according the General Social Survey question:  “What about 
sexual relations between two adults of the same sex--do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, 
wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?”  The line refers to the percent saying “always wrong.”  The 
second solid trendline refers to the Gallup question: “Do you think homosexual relations between 
consenting adults should be legal or not?”  The line refers to the percent saying gay sex should be illegal.    
As explained further in the text, the dotted lines refer to coverage of gay issues from Newsweek magazine.  
The line that crests in 1986 refers to the percent of stories in that year mentioning the word gay or 
homosexual and also mentioning AIDS.  The line referring to marriage, which begins in 17988, refers to 
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the AIDS epidemic, however, as reflected in the dashed line indicating the percent of 
stories in Newsweek magazine mentioning the words “gay” or “homosexual” and also 
mentioning AIDS.   Around the time when this share of news stories peaked, so do our 
indicators of negativity toward homosexual sex.  More dramatically, as the share of such 
stories dropped, the share of the population expressing anti-gay attitudes also fell.  In 
1986, 42 percent of Newsweek stories including the words gay or homosexual also 
mentioned AIDS.  At the same time, public opinion on whether homosexual relations 
should be illegal (according to the Gallup Poll), and whether gay sex is always wrong 
(according to the General Social Survey, or GSS) turned markedly negative.  The 
proportion of GSS respondents agreeing with the statement that “sexual relations between 
two adults of the same sex” is “always wrong” rose to its highest level ever—76 
percent—in the spring of 1987.  The proportion of Gallup respondents saying that 
homosexual sex should be illegal rose to its highest point ever: 64 percent, in the Gallup 
survey administered post-Bowers in July 1986.   
 
Bowers Lawrence
Gay sex always wrong (GSS)
AIDS coverage
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Figure 5.  Media Coverage of Gay Issues




A strikingly similar pattern is seen at the end of the time series—although this 
time the topic is “gay marriage,” rather than AIDS.  As the proportion of gay-themed 
stories mentioning gay marriage (indicated by the gray line in Figure 5) reached its height 
in 2004, anti-gay opinion rose, too: the GSS “always wrong” measure spiked upward by 
                                                                                                                                                 
the percent of stories per year mentioning the word gay or homosexual and also mentioning marriage. We 
chose Newsweek, as have other scholars, because Newsweek’s influence has remained relatively constant 
and the number of articles per issue of the magazine has remained approximately equal.  See Paul Kellstedt, 
Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preferences, 44 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 245 (2000). 
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13 percentage points from 2002 to 2004, and anti-gay opinion in the Gallup measure 
jumped as well. 
 
We cannot completely reject the possibility that Bowers had some legitimating 
impact on anti-gay public opinion, but our alternative explanation focusing on coverage 
of the AIDS epidemic suggests the story is (at least) more complicated.  We should also 
note that Bowers itself does not appear to have been a highly salient news event.  As 
shown in Figure 6 below, media coverage mentioning the word “sodomy” (a term that 
would likely correlate with newspaper stories describing the Court’s ruling) declined to 
pre-Bowers levels within three weeks after the announcement of the Court’s decision on 
June 30, 1986.  The chart depicts the number of times the terms “sodomy” appeared in 
stories published by newspapers in the Lexis-Nexis “Major Papers” and “News Wires” 
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We have also examined media coverage in the wake of Lawrence.  As shown in 
Figure 7, with respect to coverage of “sodomy” the pattern is similar to Bowers: a short 
burst of coverage during the week of the decision and then a tapering off to pre-decision 
levels soon after.  But media coverage in the wake of Lawrence also focused on the issue 
of marriage: nearly 50 stories concerning gay marriage ran in major U.S. newspapers on 
the day after Lawrence.44   
                                                 
44 The Lexis-Nexis “Major Papers” archive has limited coverage of U.S. newspapers from 1986.  To 
augment this data, we added stories from the “News Wires” archive in constructing Figure 6.  Because we 
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As shown in Figures 7 and 8, the Lawrence decision was the first event in a series 
that generated extensive coverage of the gay marriage issue.  Over the two years 
following Lawrence, coverage of gay marriage spiked periodically with several major 
news events: (1) the Vatican’s announcement in the beginning of August 2003 
condemning gay marriage, (2) the announcement of the first Goodridge opinion in 
November 2003, (3) the release of the second Goodridge opinion on February 4, 2004, 
the decision by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to issue marriage licenses one week 
later (February 12), and President Bush’s announcement of support for a constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage (February 23), (4) the beginning of the granting 
of marriage licenses to gays in Massachusetts on May 17, (5) the defeat of the gay 
marriage Constitutional amendment in the U.S. Senate on July 14,  and (6) finally, the 




































                                                                                                                                                 
did not face the problem of limited coverage for 2003, Figure 3 includes only stories in the “Major Papers” 
archive. 
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Figure 8.  Coverage of gay marriage 




































Throughout this period of intense media scrutiny, the public soured notably on the 
notion of gay marriage.  As shown in Figure 9 (indicating results from surveys conducted 
by the Pew Research Center, which has asked one of the longest-running, consistently-
worded series of questions on this topic) and Figure 10 (a smoothed plot depicting data 
from eight different survey houses45), public opinion in favor of same-sex marriage fell in 
the months following the Lawrence decision (from about 38 percent to 30 percent of the 
population), continued to fall in the aftermath of Goodridge and through the 2004 
election, and only in the summer of 2005 began to approach (and maybe even exceed) 
pre-Lawrence levels.  To get a better sense of the pace of media attention and public 
opinion shifts, Figure 11 overlays the smoothed plot of opposition to same-sex marriage 
onto the number of stories mentioning gay marriage each month in USA Today.  As 
media coverage of gay marriage increased, so did the share of the public opposing it.  As 
coverage decreased and then evaporated in 2005, the shifts in public opinion that began 
immediately after Lawrence disappeared.  By the summer of 2005, the intense, sustained 
national debate over gay marriage that began with Lawrence v. Texas in June 2003 and 
continued with Goodridge had receded.  Support for gay marriage had inched towards 40 





                                                 
45 Symbols in the graph indicate the survey houses from which data were obtained.      
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To get a better grasp on the nature of the temporary backlash on the issue of gay 
marriage in the two years following Lawrence, it is important not only to pay attention to 
the aggregate shifts in favorability, but also changes in the intensity of people’s beliefs. 
As revealed in the Pew data displayed in Figure 12, most of the movement in public 
opinion from 2003 to 2005 came from the increasing share of the population that became 
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage.  Whereas about 30 percent of the population 
strongly opposed same-sex marriage at the time of Lawrence, that figure increased about 
10 percentage points by the time of Goodridge.  Those strongly in favor increased also, 
but more modestly, from 8 percent to about 14 percent, but that shift takes place over a 
year after Lawrence, at the time of the 2004 election.  The gain among those with strong 
feelings came mainly at the expense of those who merely supported gay marriage: the 
share of the population falling into that category dropped immediately after Lawrence.  
Before Lawrence, 28 percent merely supported gay marriage, while in the first poll taken 
after Lawrence only 18 percent merely supported gay marriage.  Over the two year 
period, the share of the population that opposes same sex marriage (but does not do so 
strongly) does not change much at all.  More significantly, these substantial shifts among 
intensity groupings evaporate by 2005:  not only do aggregate support and opposition 
return to pre-Lawrence levels but the intensity of support and opposition appear almost 





Figure 12.  Intensity of opinion regarding gay marriage,
1996-2006
















One plausible interpretation of the public opinion data following the Bowers and 
Lawrence decisions would be that whenever and however the Court considers gays’ 
rights to have sex, the public recoils and a backlash against liberalization results.  In other 
words, the Court’s decision in Bowers is consistent with a story of “legitimation” of 
decreasing tolerance of legalized sex between gays, while the shift in attitudes following 
the pro-gay rights decision in Lawrence is consistent with a backlash.  We cannot 
disprove that hypothesis, but based on the media coverage of gay-related issues in the 
wake of those decisions we find alternative stories more persuasive.  With respect to 
Bowers, the rise and decline in media coverage concerning the AIDS epidemic tracks 
shifts in opinion on legalizing gay sex both before and after Bowers, a decision that we 
note was not terribly salient even a month after its release.  With respect to Lawrence, we 
think the Court’s decision did have an effect on attitudes on legalization of gay sex, but 
only insofar as the decision led to a reframing of gay rights (including the right to have 
sex) according to the frame of marriage.  As Figure 7 reveals, Lawrence was, in a sense, a 
marriage decision.  Justice Scalia’s dissent portrayed it as such46 and the media 
discussion of gays’ right to marry begins immediately after the decision.   
 
This analysis begs another question, though.  Why would the debate following 
Lawrence lead Americans to change their opinions about gay marriage and the legality of 
gay sex?  It is not readily obvious why some portion of the population would actually 
                                                 
46 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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become more anti-gay in their attitudes on sex and marriage in the wake of a pro-gay 
rights decision.  The answer, we suspect but cannot prove with the available data, derives 
from the “one-sided information flow” on the issue of gay marriage that followed the 
Lawrence decision.  No nationally prominent politician took a pro-gay marriage stance 
during the period in which we see a backlash.  Only now, in the summer of 2006, have 
four sitting U.S. Senators declared their support for legalization of same-sex marriage. 47  
As political scientists have demonstrated in other contexts, a public debate in which 
political elites take positions on only one side of a particular issue can lead to substantial 
opinion change among those with weak prior views.48  The result in the case of gay 
marriage was a highly salient, one-sided public discussion in which opponents of gay 
rights were the most vocal, contributing to the dip in support for legalization of gay sex 
and gay marriage seen in the eighteen months following Lawrence. 
 
IV. What about Goodridge? 
 
Until now, we have made little mention of the decisions of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health49 in November 
2003 and In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate50 in February 2004.  This oversight 
might appear peculiar, given that it was the Massachusetts Court’s decisions, not the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, which actually legalized gay marriage.  However, 
what may have seemed like a big political splash at the time was actually one more 
significant wave in a tide of events surrounding gay marriage in 2003 and 2004.  We time 
the beginning of the backlash in public opinion in the summer of 2003, immediately post-
Lawrence but pre-Goodridge.  To be sure, the Goodridge decisions, like the other events 
concerning the marriage controversy in the year leading up to the 2004 election, kept the 
issue in the news.  As a result, we suspect those decisions drew out the period of lowered 
public acceptance of gay marriage that began in the summer of 2003 and ended by 2005. 
 
The pace and trajectory of opinion change in Massachusetts did not differ 
substantially from that of the rest of the country, as depicted in Figure 13.  Although the 
opinion of Massachusetts respondents concerning gay marriage has always been about 15 
percentage points more favorable than that of the rest of the country, the timing and 
extent of the backlash appear consistent with the story we have told for the rest of the 
country.  The Massachusetts public was about evenly split on the issue of gay marriage 
before Lawrence, approval dropped about seven percentage points at the nadir when the 
court released the second Goodridge opinion, and in 2005 a majority, perhaps even more 
substantial than in the pre-Lawrence period approves of legalization. 
 
                                                 
47 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Press Release: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force salutes U.S. 
Sen. Russell Feingold for supporting marriage equality, April 4, 2006, available at 
http://thetaskforce.org/media/release.cfm?releaseID=932 .  The four supporters are Democratic Senators 
Russ Feingold (Wisconsin), Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts), and Ron Wyden (Oregon), and Republican 
Lincoln Chafee (Rhode Island).s 
48 See ZALLER, supra note __; John Zaller, The Myth of Massive Media Impact Revisited: New Support for 
a Discredited Idea, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE, ed. Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. 
Sniderman and Richard A. Brody, U. Michigan Press (1996) 
49 Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
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 If we are right about the timing of the backlash on gay marriage, then we think we 
have added a wrinkle to the traditional account of how courts affect public opinion 
change.  If Lawrence was the principal catalyst for public opinion change on the issue of 
marriage, then the reach of a Supreme Court opinion is to a large extent outside of the 
hands of the Justices. In other words, the fact that a decision striking down bans on gay 
sex led to a backlash on the issue of marriage suggests that broad signals from the Court 
can be easily manipulated to spill over into areas upon which it did not even pass 
judgment.  Most would view the Lawrence decision as more restrained and moderate than 
Goodridge:  striking down unpopular bans on sodomy would have seemed less 
controversial and more restrained than forcing a state to rewrite and completely transform 
its legal definition of marriage.  Nevertheless, as a result of elite framing of the issue, this 
seemingly less-controversial decision produced a short-term but wide ranging backlash 
on the issue of gay rights, specifically gay marriage. 
 
Of course, if the Court had not handed down its decision in Lawrence, but the 
Massachusetts Court still decided the Goodridge cases the way it did,51 we still would 
have expected a backlash to occur, although somewhat later.52  Goodridge, rather than 
                                                 
51 We are assuming here that Lawrence did not lead the Massachusetts Court to decide Goodridge the way 
it did.  Although we feel comfortable with that assertion, we should acknowledge the possibility that 
Lawrence emboldened the Goodridge majority both to strike down the state’s ban on same-sex marriage 
and reject civil unions as a compromise.  See Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 948 (citing Lawrence). 
52 We note only in passing that our analysis of the data from the early 1990s does not suggest that the 
Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), or the debate over the 
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Lawrence, would have been the catalyst for public opinion change, and it probably still 
would have been followed by the decision of the mayor of San Francisco to allow same-
sex marriages, the debate over a federal Constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
marriages, and the placement of anti-gay marriage referenda on the 2004 ballot – all of 
which kept the issue in the news and kept the backlash going.  We cannot know for sure 
how public opinion would have played out in such an alternate universe.  All we do know 
is that in this one the Supreme Court’s decision led to an effect in the direction opposite 
of the decision itself.  
 
 
V. The structure of opinion on gay marriage 
 
To get a handle on “who” has believed “what” about same-sex marriage “when” it 
would be optimal to have a survey with many more independent variables of interest than 
those in the Pew surveys analyzed above.  The Pew surveys have the advantage of being 
taken several times over the two year period of interest and give us a sense of the shifts in 
public opinion on the issue.  In contrast, the National Election Study (NES) survey53 we 
analyze in this section was conducted only in the nine weeks preceding the 2004 election, 
at a time when the issue of gay marriage figured prominently as revealed in the media 
attention data presented in Figure 5.54   
 
The NES, however, has the advantage of hundreds of questions in addition to the 
demographic and ideological variables of the Pew survey.  For example, the NES has 
several items designed to capture three core political values—egalitarianism, moral 
traditionalism and belief in limited government—and a “feeling thermometer” that asks 
respondents to place gays and lesbians (as well as about two dozen other demographic 
groups, institutions and political figures) on a 100-point scale designed to capture how 
“warm” or “cool” respondents feel toward them.  We present the cross tabulations of the 
NES data in Appendix B, and discuss in this Part a model derived from that survey, and 
depicted in Figure 14 and Table 2.55  
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act produced a backlash akin to that observed in the Lawrence-Goodridge 
period.  Perhaps a state court decision without a preceding Supreme Court decision on a similar topic 
would not have the effect on public opinion we observed in the recent data.  However, unlike Goodridge, 
the Hawaii decision did not lead to any marriages between gays, so the issue quickly faded from public 
view and we are unsurprised at the absence of public opinion backlash. 
53 The NES question on gay marriage is the following: “Should same-sex couples be ALLOWED to marry, 
or do you think they should NOT BE ALLOWED to marry?”   
1. Should be allowed  
2. Should not be allowed  
3. Should not be allowed to marry but should be allowed to legally form a civil union [VOLUNTEERED]  
4. Other [VOLUNTEERED] (SPECIFY)  
5. Don't know  
6. Refused  
54 One might also suppose that the existence and eventual success of anti-same-sex marriage referenda in 
13 states would also make the pre-election period exceptional in several respects.  However, our analysis of 
the NES data in the 13 referenda states (available upon request) indicates that trends in opinion on gay 
marriage were not affected in any detectable way by the referenda campaigns in these states. 
55 However, even the NES is insufficient to give us a full picture of the structure of opinion on same-sex 
marriage.  It does not include, for example, whether the respondent is gay or whether he or she has a gay 
family member, friend or coworker.  Therefore, we attempt to supplement our discussion of the NES and 
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Pew surveys with other surveys and other scholars’ research.  See Patrick J. Egan & Kenneth Sherrill. 
Neither An In-Law Nor An Outlaw Be: Trends in Americans’ Attitudes Toward Gay People, PUBLIC 
OPINION PROS, (February 2005); Joe Bergeron, Examining Determinants of American Support for Same-
Sex Marriage, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C., 2005; Paul R. Brewer,  From the Podium and the Pulpit: Opinion Leadership and 
Same-Sex Marriage.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C.; Donald  Haider-Markel & Mark Joslyn, Attributions and the Regulation of Marriage: 
Considering the Parallels Between Race and Homosexuality, 38 PS:  POLITICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS  233 (2005); C. E. Tygart, Genetic Causation Attribution and Public Support of Gay Rights,  12 
INT’L J.  PUB. OP. RES. 259 (2000);  Clyde Wilcox & Robin Wolpert. 2000. Gay Rights in the Public 
Sphere: Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Equality, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS (Craig 
A.Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000). 
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Figure 14.  A multi-stage model of determinants  





























Block II – long-term social characteristics  
 Residence 
 Family characteristics 
 Education 
 Income 
 Union membership 
 Religiosity 
Block III – values and political orientation 
 Egalitarianism 
 Moral traditionalism 
 Belief in limited government 
 Political ideology 
 Party identification 
Block IV - Feelings toward gays 
Attitude toward gay marriage 
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Table 2.  Predicting support for same-sex marriage,  
Fall 2004 National Election Study Survey56
 
Variables 
I II III IV 
(direct 
effects) 
Immutable demographic characteristics         
Age -.44 *** -.30 ** -.24 * -.20 
Black -.15 ** -.07 -.16 ** -.16**
Hispanic -.05  -.01 -.09  -.11 
Female .04  .08 * .09 * .03 
long-term social characteristics       
South   -.10 -.06  -.02 
West   -.03 -.03  -.04 
Midwest   -.13 * -.11  -.08 
Urbanicity   .07 -.01  .02 
married/widowed   -.05 -.02  -.04 
divorced/separated   -.01 -.03  -.04 
children in household   -.07 -.05  -.02 
Education   .41 *** .35 *** .27**
Income   -.06 -.02  -.07 
union household   .01 .01  .01 
attendance of religious services   -.38 *** -.21 *** -.20***
values and political orientation        
Egalitarianism     .12  .08 
moral traditionalism     -.85 *** -.80***
belief in limited government     .10  .13*
political ideology     .15 ** .14**
party identification     .13 ** .12*
Feelings toward gays        
Gay feeling thermometer score       .63***
log likelihood -501.20  -438.21  -338.65  -306.88 
pseudo-R2 .05  .17  .36  .42 
N 805  805  805  805 
                                                 
56 Cell entries are first differences derived from a probit analysis.  They are estimates of the change 
in probability of supporting gay marriage given a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of 
each independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their means.  Cell entries in bold 
are a variable’s total effect—that is, the effect of a variable on support for gay marriage before the 
consideration of the mediating effects of any intervening variables.  Probit coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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The regressions depict the effect of four different groups (or “blocks”) of 
variables on attitudes toward gay marriage, listed in rough causal order: (block I) 
immutable demographic characteristics; (II) long-term social characteristics; (III) values 
and political orientation; and (IV) feelings toward gays and lesbians.  By organizing the 
analysis in this way we can assess the direct effects of each block on attitudes on same-
sex marriage, as well as the indirect effects of earlier blocks, as mediated through the 
variables in the intervening groups.57  For example, education is associated with higher 
levels of support for gay marriage. However, education likely has both a direct effect on 
attitudes toward gay marriage and an indirect effect through the intervening variable of 
egalitarianism, which is correlated with both education and support for gay marriage. 
 
 Rather than present difficult-to-interpret probit coefficients, Table 6 instead 
presents “first differences,” which are calculated from the probit estimations and are the 
estimated change in probability of supporting gay marriage given a shift from the 
minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable, holding all other variables 
in the model constant at their mean value.58  For example, in Model IV we see that the 
direct effect of a shift in education from its minimum value (eighth grade or less) to its 
maximum value (post-graduate study) is a 27-percentage point increase in the probability 
of supporting gay marriage, holding all other variables constant at their means.  We can 
compare this direct effect to the total effect of education (estimated in Model II at 41 
percentage points) and thus calculate the indirect effect of education through the 
intervening variables in blocks III and IV as 41-27 ≈ 14 percentage points. 
 
 
A. Demographic characteristics 
 
 We consider first the effects of three immutable demographic characteristics: 
gender, race and age.  With respect to gender, we confirm what others have found:59 
namely, women tend to be more supportive of gay rights than men.  The differences are 
not substantial (about 2 to 4 percentage points), but the relationship grows when 
controlling for other factors, and then disappears once feeling toward gays is included.   
                                                 
57 This analysis, conducted in what is known as a “block recursive” approach, is performed with a series of 
four probit estimations that have the binary choice of support for gay marriage (with value one) or 
opposition (with value zero) as the dependent variable.  For a description of this technique, see WARREN E. 
MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER (1996); JAMES A.  DAVIS, THE LOGIC OF 
CAUSAL ORDER (1985).  The first estimation (Model I) includes only the variables from block I.  Each 
subsequent analysis adds an additional block in the causal chain, until the final model (Model IV) includes 
all independent variables of interest.  The total effect of any variable is estimated via the model that 
controls for all variables prior to the variable in question, but that does not control for any intervening 
variables.  These effects are presented in boldface type in Table A.  Model IV, which controls for the 
effects of all the variables, provides estimates of the direct effects of all variables.  The indirect effect of a 
variable through intervening factors is calculated by subtracting the variable’s direct effect from its total 
effect.  
58 For more on this approach to presentation, see Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation,  44 AMER. J. OF POL. SCI. 2 (2000); SCOTT J. LONG, 
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997).   
59 See, e.g., Haider-Markel & Joslyn, supra note __. 
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Racial differences in opinion on same-sex marriage are more pronounced: 
Hispanics are most supportive of gay marriage (41 percent), followed by whites (36 
percent), who are followed by African Americans (25 percent).  Once placed in the more 
sophisticated models and even controlling for anti-gay feelings, the statistical 
significance of being an African American remains (although such is not the case for 
Hispanics probably because age is responsible for their differential support).  African 
Americans remain in distinct opposition to same-sex marriage in Model IV, which 
estimates that holding other variables constant, blacks are 16 percentage points less likely 
to gay marriage than whites.    In analyzing the Pew polls, we also noticed the remarkable 
magnitude of the shift among African Americans in the past two years and the residual 
differences that remain as of the most recent survey.  As depicted in Figure 15, in July 
2003, 31 percent of African Americans approved of same-sex marriage, a figure that 
dropped to 19 percent by August 2004, and as of summer 2005 had made up most of the 
lost ground.  (As is the case with most opinion surveys, the relatively small sizes of the 
non-white samples in the Pew data make it difficult to assess whether variation over time 
is due to actual change or simply sampling error.) 
 
 
Figure 15.  Support for gay marriage by race, 2001-2005
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As discussed in the previous Part, age is one of the strongest predictors of 
attitudes on same-sex marriage, with respondents in the youngest age group (age 18 to 
25) nearly 40 percentage points more supportive of same-sex marriage than those over 
65.  The effect diminishes once controlling for other variables, and disappears once 
controlling for feelings toward gays.  We must admit that we cannot explain the 
substantial movement in the age coefficient over time, as depicted in Figure 13.  The size 
of this coefficient varies considerably between 17 and 29 points.   
 
 
B. Long-Term Social Characteristics 
 
 The regressions allow us to dispel some of what might be conventional wisdom 
concerning the effect of long term social characteristics on attitudes toward same-sex 
marriage.  As the crosstabs depict, substantial differences exist among groups as defined 
by family makeup, region of residence, religion and education.   Of these variables, 
though, only education and religiosity (as measured by church attendance) remain 
significant once the other controls are added.  For example, a little more than half of 
those who are single, but only 30 percent of those who are married, are in favor of same-
sex marriage.  The effect of marital status does not hold up once controlling for age 
(younger people are disproportionately single, of course).  Similarly, the regional 
differences in opinion on same sex marriage – with Northeasterners and Westerners about 
fifteen to twenty percentage points more supportive than Southerners or Midwesterners – 
are not statistically significant once controls are added for religiosity, race and 
education.60
    
Substantial differences exist among education groups.   At the time of the 2004 
election, according to the NES, overwhelming majorities (over 70 percent) of those with 
a high school diploma or less opposed same-sex marriage, while close to half (49 
percent) of those with a college degree were in favor.  That relationship holds up in 
multivariate analysis, with the effect of moving from the lowest to the highest education 
grouping ranging from 27 to 41 percentage points, depending on the model.  Crosstabs 
from the most recent Pew data, as of July 2005, reveal a comparable gap, although as 
depicted in Figure 13 the magnitude of the education effect has declined to pre-Lawrence 
levels. 
 
 Although religion does not appear to have any statistically significant effect,61 
religiosity continues to have – both over time and once other variables are added to the 
regression – a very powerful influence on opinion in opposition to same-sex marriage.  
                                                 
60 The same pattern holds for urbanicity – whether one lives in a city, suburb or rural area.  Those in large 
cities are much more supportive of same-sex marriage (45 percent support) than those in rural areas (25 
percent support) but the relationship does not hold up once adding the typical controls. 
61 Protestants have much more hostile attitudes on same-sex marriage than Catholics.  On average, about a 
fifteen percentage point gap exists between the two groups, but that difference does not hold up once the 
other variables are added.  Although small sample size prevents one from making any statistically 
significant conclusions about Jews, it is notable that overwhelming percentages of Jews in any survey 
conducted on this issue have voiced support for same-sex marriage – 72 percent according to the NES 
survey. 
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Those who attend church weekly are about 38 percentage points more likely to be against 
same-sex marriage as those who never attend (83 percent, as opposed to 47 percent).  The 
relationship diminishes by half when we control for ideology, traditionalist moral 
attitudes and anti-gay affect, but still remains quite powerful as compared to other 
variables in this block.  Frequency of church attendance is only one way to get at the 
differences between Americans based on religiosity.  One could also look at the 
difference between those who call themselves evangelical (only 15 percent support) and 
those who do not (39 percent support).  Breaking the population up according to how 
respondents regard the Bible shows the religious differences most starkly.  Of those who 
say the “Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally,” 85 percent oppose 
legalization of same-sex marriage, whereas 73 percent of those who say the “Bible was 
written by men” support of same-sex marriage. 
 
C. Values and Political Orientation 
 
Ideology has always been an important predictor of individual level opinion on 
same-sex marriage, and the variable has continued to rise in importance over the past two 
years.  According to the NES, over 77 percent of those who described themselves as 
extremely liberal or liberal were in favor of same-sex marriage, while over 87 percent of 
conservatives or extreme conservatives opposed it.  As the regressions indicate, the 
independent effect of ideology remains even when one controls for moral traditionalism 
and anti-gay feelings.62  Figure 16 depicts the movement in opinion among ideological 
groups over the past few years.  All ideological groupings decreased in support on same-
sex marriage in the immediate post-Lawrence period (between the July 2003 and October 
2003 Pew polls).  Conservatives and moderates have not yet recovered to their pre-
Lawrence levels, while liberals (especially those who describe themselves as “very 
liberal” of whom about 80 percent approve) are now much more supportive of same-sex 
marriage.   
 
 
                                                 
62 We observe the same pattern for party identification, and that variable’s significance remains even when 
controlling for ideology. 
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Figure 16.  Support for gay marriage by ideology, 2001-2005
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The differences between ideological groupings are not terribly surprising, but the 
finding that ideology became an increasingly powerful predictor of opinion on same-sex 
marriage is more interesting.  We demonstrate that in Figure 16a below, which graphs the 
coefficients from a multivariate analysis and estimates how the effects of the four main 
predictors of opinion—ideology, age, education, and religiosity—changed from 2001 to 
2005.63  The effect of ideology on gay marriage attitudes (holding other variables 
constant) grew dramatically over the two-year period following Lawrence: a 19-point 
change that was statistically significant (p = .002). That is, the ceteris paribus difference 
between the gay marriage attitudes of very liberal and very conservative Americans 
increased by .19 (on a zero to one scale) from 2003 to 2005.  None of the demographic 
variables show any change of similar magnitude in the post-Lawrence period. 
 
                                                 
63 This figure is derived from a regression analysis incorporating all respondents from the seven Pew 
surveys administered between 2001 and 2005.  We scaled the dependent variable—a four-choice measure 
of gay marriage attitudes—from zero (strongly oppose) to one (strongly favor).  We included dummy 
variables for each wave of the survey, and terms for respondents’ age, education, ideology, and attendance 
of religious services, as well as their sex and race.  In addition, age, education, ideology, and attendance of 
religious services were interacted with each of the wave dummy variables.  Because we ran the estimation 
without a constant term, the coefficients on the interaction terms are the ceteris paribus estimates of the 
effects of these four variables at each wave of the survey.  The absolute values of these coefficients are 
plotted in Figure 13.  Because all variables were scaled zero (minimum) to one (maximum), the relative 
sizes of these coefficients indicate the relative magnitudes of the variables’ effects. 
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Figure 16a.  The Changing Structure of Attitudes 
on Gay Marriage, 2001-2005






































 Arraying respondents according to a five or seven-point ideological scale hides 
heterogeneity among ideological groups.  By controlling for different types of ideological 
commitments we can get a better sense of what is driving opinion on same-sex marriage.  
We employ here familiar indices derived from several NES questions that attempt to 
capture attitudes defined by moral traditionalism, egalitarianism and belief in limited 
government (libertarianism).64  We broke respondents up into thirds – high, medium or 
                                                 
64 The Moral Traditionalism index derives from respondents’ agreement or disagreement with the four 
items below:  
1. “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those 
changes.” 
2. “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”  
3. “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, 
even if they are very different from our own.”  
4. “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family 
ties.” 
 
The Egalitarianism index refers to responses on the following items: 
 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity 
to succeed. 
2. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance. 
4. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
5. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. 
6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. 
 
The Limited Government index derives from responses to the following three items: 
1. Agree more with: ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because 
it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR TWO, government has 
become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.   
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low – based on the number of statements in the indices to which they agreed or disagreed.  
We are unsurprised by the finding that moral traditionalists are much more likely to be 
against same-sex marriage than non-traditionalists: 81 percent of “high” scorers on the 
moral traditionalism scale are opposed to same sex marriage, while only 42 percent of 
“low” scorers are opposed.  The magnitude of the effect, even once controlling for all 
demographic, ideological and other variables, including anti-gay affect, is still quite 
striking: moving from the lowest to the highest third on the moral traditionalism index 
increases one’s probability of being against same-sex marriage by between 80 and 85 
percentage points.  Indeed, moral traditionalism is the most powerful explanatory 
variable of all those we include – even more than anti-gay affect as measured by the 
feeling thermometer. 
  
In contrast, a belief in limited government (libertarianism) increases the 
probability that one will favor legalization of same-sex marriage.  Because libertarianism 
is often correlated with other values of political conservatism, those who score high 
appear in the cross tabs more opposed to same-sex marriage than those who are low 
scorers (32 percent as opposed to 42 percent).  Once we control for these other variables 
though, including anti-gay affect, the highest scorers are about 13 percentage points more 
likely to favor same-sex marriage than the lowest scorers. 
 
We were surprised to find no direct, statistically significant relationship for 
egalitarianism on attitudes concerning same-sex marriage.  Of course, before adding any 
controls, egalitarians are more likely to be in favor of same-sex marriage.  Those in the 
highest third according to the egalitarianism scale are evenly split on the issue of same-
sex marriage while over 70 percent of the lowest scorers are against same-sex marriage.  
However, this relationship is not statistically significant in the regressions, suggesting 
that most of the power of egalitarianism as an explanatory variable may be subsumed by 
ideology, party identification and moral traditionalism. 
 
 
D. Feelings Toward Gays and Attitudes about Homosexuality 
 
Of course, those who express “warm” feelings toward gays are much more likely 
to be in favor of same-sex marriage than those who express “cool” feelings.  88 percent 
of those who gave gays a rating between 0 and 45 on the feeling thermometer were 
opposed to same-sex marriage, while only 31 percent of those who gave ratings between 
61 and 100 opposed same sex marriage.  A move from the lowest to the highest feeling 
thermometer score increases the probability of being in favor of same-sex marriage by 63 
percentage points. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the inclusion of the respondent’s 
feelings toward gays does not undermine the direct effect that most of the values and 
                                                                                                                                                 
2. Agree more with: ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic 
problems; OR TWO, the free market can handle these problems without government being 
involved.   
3. Agree more with: ONE, the less government, the better; OR TWO, there are more things that 
government should be doing? 
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political orientation variables have on attitudes toward same sex marriage.  In contrast, 
age and gender (but not race) decline to statistical insignificance once we include feelings 
toward gays in the regression.  This suggests that age and gender have an effect on 
respondents’ attitudes towards gays but not an independent and direct effect on their 
attitudes toward same-sex marriage per se. 
 
 Several other researchers have recognized a relationship between individuals’ 
beliefs as to the origins (or etiology) of homosexuality and their support for same-sex 
marriage.65  Those studies find, for example, that respondents who see homosexuality as 
the result of genetic or biological factors rather than as the result of situational factors and 
personal choices were more likely to support same-sex marriage and domestic 
partnership laws.  Indeed, Donald Haider-Markel and Mark Joslyn find that support for 
same-sex marriage has gone up almost in parallel with rates of response attributing 
homosexuality to genetics instead of upbringing.66
 
Our analysis of the October 2003 Pew survey confirms what these researchers 
have found.  That survey asked the following question: “In your opinion, when a person 
is homosexual is it something they are born with, something that develops because of the 
way people are brought up or just the way that some people prefer to live.”  It also asked 
the respondent “Is homosexuality something that can be changed?”  The answers to both 
questions are highly correlated with the respondent’s support or opposition to same-sex 
marriage as the tables below indicate.  59 percent of those who think homosexuality is 
something people are born with support same-sex marriage (38 percent merely support 
and 21 percent strongly support), whereas among those who think it is the result of 
upbringing or personal preferences only 23 percent support same-sex marriage.  Similar 
disparities are apparent from the “born with” question, and both variables are 
significantly associated with opinion on gay marriage when placed alongside the familiar 
variables from Figure 14.  (Because this question was asked only once and not alongside 
the other questions from which we derived the moral traditionalism and other indices we 
cannot know for sure how well these variables hold up.) 
 
                                                 
65 See Tygart, supra note __,;  Haider-Markel & Joslyn, supra note __; Bergeron, supra note __.  
66 See Haider-Markel & Joslyn, supra note __. 
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Table 3.  Explanations of Homosexuality and Same-Sex Marriage Attitudes 
 
 




Oppose Oppose Support 
Strongly 
Support 
Beliefs about causes of homosexuality     
fixed at birth 18.2 22.4 38.1 21.2 
due to upbringing 51.5 25.1 18.1 5.3 
The way some people prefer to live 47.8 28.9 19.4 3.8 
don’t know  21.2 29.3 21.3 6.3 
     
Beliefs about whether homosexuality can be changed     
can be changed 53.3  27.0 16.4 3.3 
cannot be changed 22.9 23.1 36.6 17.4 
don’t know 42.6 35.1 17.4 4.9 
 
Source for data: Pew Research Center survey, October 2003.  N = 2,434. 
 
The data concerning whether someone knows someone who is gay follows a 
similar pattern.   The July and October 2003 Pew surveys asked respondents “Do you 
have a friend, colleague or family member who is gay?”  Those who answered “yes” 
were about twice as likely to support same-sex marriage as those who said they did not 
know someone who was gay (49 percent as opposed to 25 percent).  Although we 
suspected that knowing someone who is gay (or at least admitting it to a survey 
researcher) is highly correlated with liberalism, education, region and other factors, we 
find that the variable is still statistically significant (p < .001) when placed in a regression 
alongside the other variables in the Pew survey.  As with one’s beliefs about the origins 
of homosexuality, we cannot be sure how this relationship would hold up if we controlled 
for moral traditionalism and attitudes toward gays.  However, we suspect that proximity 
to gays has its principal effect on one’s attitudes toward them (the type of opinion the 
feeling thermometer picks up) as opposed to marriage per se.  Even so, we should note 
that to know someone is not necessarily to love them (or to want the state to recognize 
their love for another).  It is not as if most people who know someone who is gay think 





Table 4 – Proximity to Gays and Attitudes toward Same Sex Marriage 
 
 




Oppose Oppose Support 
Strongly 
Support 
Do you have a friend, colleague or 
family member who is gay?     
Yes 30.3 21.0 33.1 15.6 
No 42.3 32.4 20.8 4.5 
Not Sure/Refused 32.5 53.2 14.3 0 
 
Source for data: July and October 2003 Pew Research Center surveys, N = 3,830. 
 
 
VI. Opinion on questions related to legalization of same-sex marriage 
 
A. Civil unions  
 
The heated debate surrounding same-sex marriage produced an important 
outcome favorable to gay-rights activists: an unmistakable rise in support for civil unions.  
As shown in Figure 17, support for civil unions—which provide some legal status to 
same-sex couples but fall short of marriage—grew between mid-2003 and mid-2005. 67  
This may partially be due to the fact that during this time, political elites across the 
ideological spectrum expressed support for civil unions – that is, the information flow on 
civil unions was largely in a pro-gay rights direction.  For example, both President Bush 
and his Democratic challenger, John Kerry, stated their support for civil unions during 
the 2004 election campaign.68
 
In this context, small differences in question wording can have big impacts on 
responses.  Two important question-wording effects regarding civil unions can be 
identified.  First, surveys that offer an up-or-down choice on civil unions (like those 
charted in Figure 17) tend to find less support for some kind of legal recognition of gay 
couples than do surveys that offer three options (marriage, civil unions, or no legal 
recognition).  When the question is asked in the three-option format, a majority supports 
some form of legal recognition: in recent surveys, 20 to 28 percent say they favor 
marriage, 30 to 39 percent are in favor of civil unions, and 35 to 45 percent believe gay 
couples should have no legal recognition.  Support for marriage and opposition to any 
legal recognition are thus less than what is found in up-or-down questions regarding 
marriage and civil unions.  In other words, offering the “middle” civil union option draws 
people away from the extremes, a phenomenon familiar to survey researchers.69   
                                                 
67 See generally Karlyn Bowman, supra note † ; Ken Cimino & Gary M. Segura, From Radical to 
Conservative: Civil Unions, Same-sex Marriage, and the Structure of Public Attitudes,  Paper presented at 
the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 2005. 
68 See Elisabeth Bumiller, The 2004 Campaign: Same-Sex Marriage; Bush Says His Party Is Wrong To 
Oppose Gay Civil Unions, NEW YORK TIMES,  Oct. 26, 2004, at A21. 
69 See G. Kalton et al., The Effects of Offering a Middle Response Option with Opinion Questions, 29 THE 
STATISTICIAN  65 (1980); Stanley Presser & Howard Schuman, The Measurement of the Middle Position in 
Attitude Surveys,  44 PUB. OP. Q. 70 (1980).  
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A second important effect of question wording is that survey participants are more 
comfortable granting gay couples specific marriage-like rights than they are in favor of 
allowing either same-sex marriage or creating civil unions.  Steady majorities of 
Americans are in favor of inheritance rights, social security survivor benefits, hospital 
visitation, and other specific rights for gay couples.70  In other words, when the benefits 
of civil unions (or for that matter, marriage) are unpacked, the public is quite in favor of 
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Regardless of how the question was asked in opinion surveys, civil unions 
became markedly more popular in the year when same-sex marriage received great 
attention in the courts and on the front page of the nation’s newspapers.  As with same-
sex marriage, we have tried to get a sense of the changing structure of opinion on civil 
unions.  In multivariate analysis (not provided here for space reasons) conducted with 
data from four Pew surveys, we that the structure of support for civil unions was very 
similar to that for same-sex marriage: for example, education, liberal ideology, and 
Democratic party identification were significantly associated with support for civil 
unions. 71  We also found that more religious, lower income, and male respondents to be 
                                                 
70 See generally Karlyn Bowman, supra note †  (detailing survey results for a host of questions on gay 
rights). 
71 The precise wording of the Pew survey question on civil unions is: “Do you strongly favor, favor, 
oppose, or strongly oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to enter into legal agreements with each other 
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more likely to be opposed to civil unions, holding other variables constant. Only the 
variable of age—an important predictor of attitudes regarding marriage—did not emerge 
as a significant predictor of support of civil unions.   
 
B. Constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage 
 
As with civil unions, the format of the question on a constitutional amendment to 
ban gay marriage can have predictable and considerable effects on the response received.   
Support for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage has vacillated 
between 40 percent and 60 percent since the idea was proposed.  However, questions that 
stress the dramatic nature of a constitutional amendment or its effect on state power elicit 
a much lower level of favorable response than do questions that simply highlight the 
proposed amendment’s definition of marriage. 
 
Questions that emphasize the character of the amendment as “defining marriage 
as between a man and a woman” usually elicit majority support.  For example, the share 
of the population giving a favorable response to the Gallup question – “Would you favor 
or oppose a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as being between a 
man and a woman, thus barring marriages between gay or lesbian couples?” – has 
hovered between 48 percent and 57 percent.72  By contrast, questions that prime 
respondents to think about federalism or the exceptional nature of a constitutional 
amendment elicit favorable reactions from only a minority of the population.  The 
Annenberg National Election Study asked the following question three times in 2004: 
“Would you favor or oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution saying that no state 
can allow two men to marry each other or two women to marry each other?”  Only 40 
percent to 42 percent of the population said they favored such an amendment.73  For the 
most part, when controlling for question-wording effects, support for a constitutional 
amendment is consistently lower than opposition to legalization of same-sex marriage, 
but follows the same pattern: a rise in support following Lawrence and Goodridge and 
through to the 2004 election, and then a decline by the summer of 2005.74
 
The pattern of opinion on the constitutional amendment and civil union questions 
suggests both the firmness of the convictions of opponents of same-sex marriage and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
that  would give them many of the same rights as married couples?”  The surveys were administered in 
October 2003, March 2004, August 2004, and July 2005. 
72 See Bowman, supra note __. 
73 A similar result comes from the ABC/Washington Post polling question that asked:  “Would you support 
amending the U.S. Constitution to make it illegal for homosexual couples to get married anywhere in the 
U.S., or should each state make its own laws on homosexual marriage?”  Only 38 percent supported such 
an amendment in January of 2004 and 46 percent supported it a month later. 
74 We do not have much of a story to tell with respect to the structure of opinion on a constitutional 
amendment.  Throughout the four surveys where Pew asked the question the power of different variables in 
our same-sex marriage model to predict opinion on a constitutional amendment varies considerably.  The 
only notable findings, it would appear, were a temporary rise in the power of religiosity, education and 
ideology at the time of the August 2004 survey, and the relatively small effect that age has on opinion 
concerning an amendment.  The Pew survey question on a proposed constitutional amendment is as 
follows:  “There has been a proposal to change the U.S. Constitution to ban gay marriage.  Do you think 
amending the Constitution to ban gay marriage is a good idea, or a bad idea?” 
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potential strategies for each side in framing the debate.  On the one hand, a core 35 
percent to 40 percent of the American population will favor almost any measure to 
prevent gays and lesbians from achieving legal recognition for their relationships, even to 
the point of approving of a constitutional amendment to prevent states from recognizing 
gay marriages.  In the middle are the 25 percent to 30 percent of the population who are 
opposed to the idea of attaching the word “marriage” to gay and lesbian relationships, but 
when phrased as encroaching on state discretion they will oppose (or at least not support) 
a constitutional amendment and they are open to legal recognition of gay relationships 
through civil unions or other measures.  Then there are the die-hard gay marriage 
supporters, who amount to about 25 to 30 percent of the population, who favor gay 
marriage and civil unions, and oppose constitutional amendments preventing them.  
Finally, there are the 5 percent to 10 percent of Americans who do not have an opinion on 




 It is quite fashionable for academics to postulate about the backlash that results 
from alleged instances of judicial overreaching.  In fact, at least in terms of the effect of 
court decisions on public opinion on the particular issue adjudicated, short-term backlash 
is quite rare.   From our preliminary look at comparable data, we do not find that Brown 
v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, or Furman v. Georgia altered the preexisting trends 
concerning desegregation, abortion rights or the death penalty.75  We also have not found 
such an effect with respect to the school prayer cases, the flag burning cases or Miranda.  
For the most part, the trend that preexists the decision continues afterward or in a few 
cases, the trend in public opinion on the issue may move in the direction of the Court’s 
decision. 
  
 The public opinion changes following Lawrence are unique in this respect.  
Unlike Bowers, which did not interrupt a rising tide of anti-gay opinion that tracked 
concerns about AIDS, Lawrence temporarily reversed a trend in favor of legalization of 
same-sex sexual relations.  Given the extensive media coverage on the issue of same-sex 
marriage following the decision, we argue (but cannot definitively prove) that the 
framing of gay rights issues in terms of marriage led to this temporary backlash.  The rise 
in the share of the population expressing unfavorable views on same-sex marriage 
continued as events unfolded over the next two years, such as the Vatican’s 
pronouncement, the two Goodridge decisions, the granting of marriages to same-sex 
couples in San Francisco, President Bush’s calling for a constitutional amendment 
restricting marriage to straight couples, and the 2004 election campaign.  Our analysis 
suggests that the rise in the salience and coverage of same-sex marriage had two effects: 
it temporarily pushed the entire population in a direction against same-sex marriage and 
gay rights, and it polarized respondents with respect to marriage along ideological lines.   
 
 The Lawrence backlash appears to have been short-lived.  As the dust has settled, 
aggregate opinion on same-sex marriage appears to be quite similar to its pre-Lawrence 
                                                 
75 See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin and Patrick 
Egan eds., forthcoming 2008).. 
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levels, and in the meantime, the share of the population approving of civil unions appears 
to have increased.  This is not to say that Americans have suddenly become keen to the 
idea: a majority of Americans continues to disapprove of same-sex marriage, and those 
who disapprove feel stronger about their convictions than those who approve.  Smaller 
shares of the population approve of the idea of a constitutional amendment banning same 
sex marriages, although question wording differences on these polls can produce widely 
varying results. 
 
 The structure of opinion on same-sex marriage follows much of the conventional 
wisdom on the issue.  As one would expect, age, education, ideology and religiosity are 
very strong predictors of opinion on gay marriage, with younger, liberal, more educated, 
and less religious respondents the most likely to approve.  However, even when one 
controls for anti-gay attitudes, moral traditionalism, more so than the various 
demographic factors or conservatism and religiosity as conventionally defined, explains 
opposition to same-sex marriage.  In addition, a person’s belief in limited government has 
a significant impact, with libertarians more likely to be in favor of same-sex marriage, all 
other things being equal.  
 
 The shifts in the structure of opinion since Lawrence give us some insight into 
one potential relationship between court decisions and shifts in public opinion.  We find 
evidence that in the post-Lawrence era ideology has become a better predictor of opinion 
on same-sex marriage.  This provides some evidence for the hypothesis that, by 
increasing the salience of certain issues that are not ideologized in the mass public, a 
court’s decision, alongside related media discussion and elite behavior, can ideologize an 
issue not previously though to fall on the liberal to conservative continuum.  We do not 
want to overstate the case either with respect to same-sex marriage or judicial action 
generally.  Indeed the greatest leap in significance in ideology occurs well after the courts 
decisions.  Nevertheless, if our evaluation of the evidence is correct, we should not 
expect much in the way of opinion backlash from another court decision on this issue.  If 
opinion on same-sex marriage has now become a function of people’s pre-existing 
ideological commitments, instead of the degree to which people are informed or attentive 
to the issue, then additional court decisions and other elite action should not produce the 
same kind of shifts that followed the original wave of elite action between 2003 and 
2004.   This assessment should be greeted with a mixed reaction by gay rights supporters. 
The more fully ideologized the issue of gay marriage is, the smaller the expected impact 
of any future political event, including a court case.  On the other hand, if being liberal 
means (in part) supporting gay marriage and being conservative means opposing it, then 
we should not expect many people to stray far from the ideological and moral 









Support for legalization of gay marriage, July 2005 
Source: Pew Research Center 
 





TOTAL 11.8 22.3 23.5 30.5 11.9 
      
GENDER      
Male 10.8 21.3 24.9 32.8 10.1 
Female 12.7 23.2 22.2 28.3 13.6 
      
RACE      
White 12.1 22.1 23.8 30.7 11.4 
Black 6.9 18.5 24.6 36.2 13.8 
Hispanic 14.7 22.1 24.2 28.4 10.5 
Other 12.4 26.8 17.5 26.8 15.5 
      
AGE      
18-29 21.3 25.0 17.6 31.4 4.8 
30-40 17.2 24.8 20.0 28.0 10.0 
40-50 10.3 23.8 23.2 30.8 11.9 
51-62 11.8 26.0 22.3 26.6 13.3 
63+ 5.5 14.0 29.3 35.9 15.3 
      
EDUCATION      
Less than High School 10.0 11.1 26.7 41.1 11.1 
High School 8.8 18.1 27.4 34.7 11.0 
Some College 8.8 22.2 22.7 32.2 14.1 
College + 17.0 27.3 20.4 24.5 10.8 
      
INCOME      
~ $30,000 10.4 20.4 25.3 30.0 13.9 
$30,000-50,000 13.2 20.6 26.5 31.2 8.5 
$50,000-100,000 11.9 23.5 20.9 33.5 10.3 
$100,000 + 19.8 29.3 21.6 21.6 7.8 
      
HAVING CHILDREN      
No Child 11.6 22.7 23.4 29.9 12.4 
Have children 12.8 21.4 22.8 32.3 12.4 
      
REGION      
Northeast 12.2 29.9 22.6 21.2 14.2 
Midwest 10.1 21.7 24.6 31.3 12.2 
South 8.9 16.4 23.8 38.6 12.4 
West 18.0 26.0 22.6 24.5 8.9 
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Protestant 6.7 16.9 27.2 38.3 10.9 
Catholic 10.6 26.5 22.3 27.4 13.2 
Other 5.5 16.4 34.2 39.7 4.1 
      
EVANGELICAL      
Yes 4.9 10.0 24.9 52.0 8.3 
No 11.4 27.8 27.2 20.5 13.1 
      
RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE     
More than once a week 4.6 6.7 21.4 60.9 6.3 
Once a week 6.2 16.4 26.2 40.8 10.5 
Once or twice a month 13.0 22.6 26.0 22.6 15.9 
A few times a year 12.0 29.7 26.3 20.5 11.6 
Seldom/Never 20.7 33.1 19.4 13.4 13.4 
      
IDEOLOGY      
Very Liberal 46.2 33.8 1.5 12.3 6.2 
Liberal 33.2 34.0 10.5 9.3 13.0 
Moderate 8.3 28.8 26.8 22.1 14.0 
Conservative 2.7 10.8 31.4 47.2 7.9 
Very Conservative 2.9 2.9 16.5 74.8 2.9 
      
PARTY IDENTIFICATION      
Republican 3.2 11.8 31.1 45.8 8.2 
Independent 14.8 26.8 19.1 26.2 13.1 
Democrat 17.7 27.7 20.1 21.1 13.5 
      
NEWS ATTENTION (Scale)     
Low 13.0 22.7 19.5 32.5 12.2 
Medium 10.6 24.9 27.8 25.3 11.4 
High 12.8 19.3 23.7 33.3 10.9 
      
 
 
News Attention Scale (derived from 5 items) 
 
News about the current situation in Iraq 
The retirement of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
The move by a Chinese firm to buy the American oil company Unocal  
Recent hurricanes that have affected the Gulf Coast of the U.S. 






Demographic Breakdown of Attitudes toward Same Sex Marriage, Fall 2004 
Source: National Election Studies 
 
 Support Oppose DK/ 
Refused 
TOTAL 35.1 61.8 3.2 
    
GENDER    
Male 34.4 63.8 1.9 
Female 35.7 60.0 4.3 
    
RACE    
White 36.2 60.9 3.0 
Black 25.4 70.4 4.1 
Hispanic 41.2 55.9 2.9 
Asian 51.9 44.4 3.7 
    
AGE    
18-29 50.2 47.2 2.6 
30-40 42.9 54.2 3.0 
41-50 33.3 64.0 2.7 
51-62 32.2 64.9 2.9 
63+ 18.3 77.2 4.6 
    
EDUCATION    
Less than High School 23.8 73.3 2.9 
High School 24.3 71.6 4.1 
Some College 35.5 62.2 2.5 
College + 49.0 48.1 2.9 
    
INCOME    
~ $25,000 32.4 63.3 4.3 
$25,000~50,000 36.5 62.3 1.2 
$50,000~105,000 37.0 60.5 2.4 
$105,000~ 40.1 56.3 3.5 
    
MARITAL STATUS    
Married 29.7 66.9 3.4 
Widowed 18.2 76.1 5.7 
Divorced 38.6 57.9 3.6 
Separated 24.4 75.6 0.0 
Never Married 51.0 47.1 1.9 
    
HAVING CHILDREN    
No Child 35.4 61.7 3.0 
1 Child 34.2 63.3 2.5 
2 + Children 34.0 61.3 4.7 
    
REGION    
Northeast 44.8 52.2 3.0 
North Central 28.1 67.8 4.1 
South 27.1 69.7 3.3 
West 48.4 49.6 2.0 
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 Support Oppose DK/ 
Refused 
URBANICITY    
Rural 25.4 71.0 3.6 
Small Town 34.4 62.5 3.2 
Suburb 34.8 60.9 4.2 
Large City 45.1 52.8 2.1 
Inner City 37.1 60.0 2.9 
    
RELIGION    
Protestant 15.6 80.5 3.9 
Catholic 32.2 63.3 4.5 
Jewish 81.5 18.5 0.0 
Other 28.0 69.3 2.8 
    
RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE    
Every Week 14.7 82.7 2.6 
Almost Every Week 17.8 79.3 3.0 
Once or Twice a Month 28.1 66.5 5.4 
A Few Times a Year 48.5 47.4 4.1 
    
BIBLE    
Bible is actual word of God and is to be taken literally 11.1 85.1 3.8 
Bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally 40.6 56.3 3.1 
Bible is written by men 73.3 25.6 1.1 
    
IDEOLOGY    
Extremely Liberal 77.8 22.2 0.0 
Liberal 77.1 20.0 2.9 
Slightly Liberal 54.7 43.2 2.1 
Moderate 42.2 54.5 3.3 
Slightly Conservative 20.6 76.5 3.3 
Conservative 10.9 87.5 1.6 
Extremely Conservative 9.1 90.9 0.0 
(Haven’t thought) (28.3) (66.9) (4.8) 
    
PARTY IDENTIFICATION    
Republican 17.3 79.9 2.7 
Independent 41.3 56.3 2.4 
Democrat 44.2 51.9 3.9 
    
EGALITARIANISM (Scale)    
Low 24.7 71.8 3.6 
Medium 31.0 67.3 1.6 
High 46.9 50.1 2.9 
    
MORAL TRADITIONALISM (Scale)    
Low 55.1 42.3 2.6 
Medium 30.0 67.5 2.5 
High 15.5 81.4 3.1 
    
BELIEF IN LIMITED GOVERNMENT (Scale)    
Low 42.2 55.6 2.2 
Medium 33.5 63.8 2.8 
High 32.2 65.3 2.5 
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 Support Oppose DK/ 
Refused 
FEELING THEROMOMETER ON GAYS AND LESBIANS 
0-45 10.1 87.8 2.1 
46-60 36.8 58.7 4.5 
61-100 67.1 31.0 1.9 
    
 
Wording of questions for egalitarianism, moral traditionalism and limited government scales: 
 
Egalitarianism (six agree/disagree items): 
 
▪ Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has  
an equal opportunity to succeed. 
▪ We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
▪ One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an 
equal chance. 
▪ This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal  
people are. 
▪ It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. 
▪ If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. 
 
Moral traditionalism (four agree/disagree items):  
▪ “'The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those 
changes.” 
▪ “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”  
▪ “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral 
standards, even if they are very different from our own.”  
▪ “'This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional 
family ties.” 
 
Belief in limited government (three forced choice items): 
▪ Agree more with: ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is 
because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR TWO, 
government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.   
▪ Agree more with: ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic 
problems; OR TWO, the free market can handle these problems without government being 
involved.   
▪ Agree more with: ONE, the less government, the better; OR TWO, there are more things that 
government should be doing? 
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